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# 「文藝春秋」

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## 獨逸外交の理念

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獨逸の外交は云ふ迄もなくヒトラー總統の外交である。ヒトラーは外交の三原則といふ名譽を Ehre、平等 Gleichheit、自由 Freiheit を上げて居る。即ち獨逸の名譽を冒し、平等を妨げ、自由を奪ふが如き事に對しては、敢然といふ此が改善に努力せんとするものである。例へばヴェルサイユ條約は此の三原則に及するものである。故に此の体制から脱せんと努力したるであり、再軍備の宣言、ロカルノ條約の破棄、ラインラントの占領、その他獨逸が今日世界外交界と後に睦若ならしめつゝある諸々の果敢なる行動は、一とてこの三綱領より出でざるはない。獨逸の名譽の爲に、獨逸の平等の爲に更に獨逸の自由の爲に、その障害となつてゐるものは一日も早く除去せねばならぬのである。

勿論實際問題といふは必ずしも原則通りには行かぬ。何れ國に於ても、外交の原則は立派なものを掲げる。弱國は力及ばずしてその理想を實行に移せず、強國は力に頼つて原則の盾の陰に隠れる。ただ獨逸は着々その理想、指導する原理を實現しつゝある國の一つと云へよう。傍觀者からは或ひは國家理想遂行に急いで、多分の無理なきやの懸念も與へようが、少くもヒトラー自身は機を見て堅実に



外交政策を爲しぬると云ふ自信を持つてゐる。斯る考へ方は種々の外交政策に現はれてゐる。一例を挙げれば、最近の波蘭紛擾に於て世に喧傳されし「白書」に現れたる英國政府と、間に交されたヒトラーの外交文書によるも明かである。即ち英國は獨逸軍が波蘭に侵入したる時獨逸軍の撤退を希望し、改めし白紙状態に於て獨逸兩國政府間の商議開催を從へ通し、然る時英政府も亦此商議に参加すべし事を申述べたのである。然るにヒトラーは斷乎この要請を拒絶した。獨逸軍は進軍延期の目的を達した後、即ち戦勝を確保せる後ならは英佛の斯る提案に耳を傾ける事も出来やうが、未だ正當な理由による出兵の目的を達成せざる中、外交交渉の便宜の爲として、撤兵することは獨逸の「名譽」の爲に不可能であるに於て居るが如きである。以て如何に名譽を重んずるかを知る。

然し乍ら無論今日の紛糾せる國際關係にあつては、從に口舌のみを以てして、國家を安泰ならしめる事は出来ぬ。その背後にある支柱として強大なる軍を短時日に整備し、斯る実力の支援のもとに、三原則の獨自の外交を爲さんとした事は窺知し得るものである。目的貫徹の爲には最悪の場合には戦争の勃發に至るを覚悟し、事に當つた爲、屢々無血の勝利を収める事が出来たのである。爲政者の事の成行を見る明敏と、機に臨んでの決斷と、強力なる軍隊、全國民を引きつけて行く一絲乱れざる統制と信頼があつてこそ、今日の獨逸再建の難業が果されつゝあるものである。しかる複雑なる歐洲情勢



の中に於てよく今日を致したと云はざるを得ぬ。

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然しオースタリーを併合し、前後二回に亘りチエコを處理した  
無血外交が、今と問題とを契機とし、ポーランドを殲滅し遂  
に英佛を敵とす。第二次世界大戦の端緒をなした事は、その  
外交の失敗を見做し得ようか。蓋し外交は相手國あつての外交  
である。その時に臨んで如何様にも変化しうる性質のもの  
であつて、今次戦争に到れるを獨外交の失敗乃至誤算と考  
へる事は必ずしも至當の言ではない。獨逸は從來とても常に戰  
争の準備をし、その基礎に立つて凡ゆる政策を行つて來つた。  
即ち自主積極の政策を行つた時、相手國の出現では何時  
にても干戈に訴へる決心があつた。斯くして無血外交の勝利を  
云はれたのであつて、今回も斷乎たる決意は決して変化し  
はぬ。外交と軍事の斯る密接なる連繫こそ現在最も  
必要なることである。

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獨逸の不可侵條約締結の如きは、如何にも兩國共に惡く云へ  
ば狡猾の感を與へる。これにより憤慨した國民も少くない事と  
思ふ。然し乍ら一國の生死の瀬戸際に立つて、二正面作戰を考  
へ、一正面で済むが或は此により戦いを避けるを得るが、  
沈の分れ目に立たされた獨逸の最後にとつた方策として、我々は  
此を正面から反對するものではなからうと思ふ。たゞ現在のソ  
聯が一方にバルチック海に進出し、一方極東に於ては日本との接  
近を欲とめるではなからうか。勿論外交の事は臆測を許

さぬがソ聯をこの際支那が手を引かざる事が可能ではないかと思ふのである。

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獨逸外交はヒトラー總統自ら行ふ。リッベントロップはそのよき輔佐役である。ヒトラー自身は歐洲大戰の一等兵出身であつて何等外交の経験はない。彼独自の性格から世界一流の人物となり、外交家ともなつたのである。彼は國務の繁忙の間常に歴史、哲學の書に親しみよく考へ、一切の方策を彼の頭に結晶した原理より割出してゐるのである。リッベントロップは全くヒトラーと一心同体であり、ヒトラーの外交上の信念をもよく理解し、獨逸外交はこの二人の手によつて成ると云つても過言ではない。されば、その世界を驚嘆せしめる敏速果敢な外交を實行し得たのである。リッベントロップは非常に明敏な頭腦の持主であり、獨逸人に珍らしく勤めの人である。しかも非常に強固な意志を持ち、一度び爲さうとした事は必ずやり通す型の人物である。蓋し現在のナチス・イデオロギーからなる積極外交には他に適任者を見ざる程のうそつけの外交輔佐役である。

リッベントロップの特長は更に云へば、勞をいとぬ點である。或る政策の實行に當るは必ず多少の障礙難關に逢着するが當りである。かかる際、彼はローマへでもロンドンへでも直に飛んで行き、敏速に處理する。誠に近代的國際政治家である。かかる活動型の人であるから、小啖郎に拘泥する事なく、細い交渉、論争は何れでもよい大綱をいつかり掴まうとする。その意味で私は幾度か具體的接衝に際して彼の勤めよさを認めざるを得なかつたのである。



彼は朝は外国人の事として早くも朝が夜は実に遅くまで仕事をも頑張り、所謂官僚政治家の金と力とを具にする政治家である。

彼は駐在武官として、ゲーリング以下の軍人との交渉多く大使となつては、リッペン、トロープ等の外交官政治家と識つたが、其等を通じて感じた事は、ナチス指導部層は何れも肚が据つて居り、年齿尚若かつた事である。

一九三三年十一月のヒトラーに於ける暴動以來、現在のナチス黨員は、共産主義、社会民主主義の壓迫を受け、幾度か生死の間をくり朝夕危隊に身を曝し、敗残の獨逸を今日あらしめる爲、東奔西走したのである、それが彼等の人格に影響し、彼等を陶冶し、眞に國家の前途を憂ふ國難に處する爲政治家たらしめたと思ふ。

獨逸人は一般にどうであるが、ヒトラー總統は日本に對し信頼尊敬、念強く政治上の利害關係は勿論あつた事であるが、日本の國體日本人の性格を非常に信頼してゐる。

ヒトラーはゲルマンの歴史、立國の基礎、傳統に注意を拂ひ、學校教育もその點に力を注いでゐた、蓋しその國の歴史を尊敬する國民に、始めて其の國家の一員としての責任を果し得る事を彼は知つてゐたからであらう。彼が我が二千年六百年の歴史に尊敬の念を持つたのも當然の事である。

彼は又、常に勇敢な事を教へてゐる、九月一日國會にその演説に、我れ前線にて戦死せし後はゲーリングに指揮を委ね、ゲーリング

襲れはへスその仕となりへス襲れは黨員中最も勇敢なる者  
を選定せよと云つて直ちに戦場へ出第一線に赴いたのである。  
日本人も亦非常に勇敢であり死を恐れない国民である。トッ  
ーはかく虚信に忠実にして勇猛果敢なるを愛した。

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さて歐洲戦争はどうなるかと云ふ豫想は当事者によつて  
断案を下せないふる知である。近代戦は長期に及ぶ國家  
總力戦争との見方が行はれてゐる。今日の獨逸はもとより此を  
熟知してゐる。しかも戦争を始めたのは長期戦に備へる準備ある  
と共に短期に勝利を齎し得る作戦上の自信があるのではな  
いかとも思はれる。然し勝利は云ふ如く水ものであり何れが勝  
つとも云へぬ。

過去の戦争の尺度を以て今次の戦争を計る事は危険である。嘗て  
の正面作戦は今正面作戦となり各國共に戦争を局地化せんと  
してゐる。我々は世界の動きに絶えず眼を注ぎ戦争をよく研究  
しその結果に當つて靜に考へねばならぬ。交戦國と非参加國と  
に拘らず強國は皆この戦争に影響をうけるものである。政  
府はこの際國策を確立し勇往邁進せねばならぬ。

今日對米政策も對ソ政策もこれを大きく我が世界政策  
の環として把握せねばならぬ。將來の日本のために大計を立て  
國民を統一納得せしめる事が必要である。

歐洲戦争は二十五年目に來つた。これを機に我が日本が  
益々世界に隆盛となるやう何人も努力すべきである。



The Bungei Shunju  
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### The Idea of German Diplomacy

(SHIMA Hiroshi)

German diplomacy is, as a matter of fact, Fuehrer Hitler's diplomacy. Hitler mentions honour (Ehre), equality, (Gleichheit) and freedom (Freiheit) as the three principles of diplomacy. In other words, he means to bravely endeavour to improve such things as impair the honour of Germany, hinder her equality and take her freedom away.

For instance, the Versailles Treaty is against these three principles. Therefore Germany tried to break herself off from this regime, and the declaration of re-armaments, the denunciation of the Locarno Treaty, the occupation of Rhineland and other daring acts with which Germany is now throwing the world into utter amazement--they have all come from these three principles. Any obstacle to the honour of Germany, to the equality of Germany, and to the freedom of Germany must be swept as soon as possible.

Practical affairs of course do not always conform with principles. Each country has her own fine diplomatic principles. Weak countries are too powerless to carry out their ideals, while strong ones, depending upon their power, entrench themselves behind the shield of their principles. Germany, however, may be said to be one of those countries which are steadily carrying out their ideals and leading principles. Lookers-on may think that their state ideals are carried out too hastily and somewhat overbearingly, but at least Hitler himself is convinced that he is carrying out sound diplomatic policies at opportune moments.

This way of thinking is revealed in various diplomatic policies. To cite an example, it is clearly shown in Hitler's diplomatic document exchanged with the British Government in the well-known "blank document" in the recent Polish trouble. That is to say, Great Britain desired the withdrawal of the German



forces when they advanced into Poland, suggested that Germany and Poland should negotiate afresh on a blank slate and proposed that the British Government should also join in these negotiations at such time. Hitler, however, flatly refused this request.

As answered the German forces might give ear to such requests of Great Britain and France when they had accomplished the aim of their advances, namely after they had secured victory, but while the objective of advances with good reasons is not achieved, for the sake of German "honor", it is impossible to withdraw her troops, even for the convenience of diplomatic negotiations. This shows us how important they think of honour.

In the complicated international relations of today, however, mere speech cannot secure the safety of a country. It can be understood that she /Germany/ has endeavoured to maintain a strong army in a short time as a support to back her and to carry out her own diplomacy of the three principles under the support of this real power. She has often achieved bloodless victory because to accomplish her purposes, she attended to affairs being prepared for war in the worst case. The difficult work of the present reconstruction of Germany has been accomplished entirely because of the sagacity of the statesmen to perceive the development of things, decision at the right moment, a powerful army, perfect command with the whole nation under it and /the nation's/ trust /in the command/. It deserves our admiration that Germany has made herself what she is under the complicated situation of Europe.

Can it be considered that the bloodless diplomacy, however, which annexed Austria, and dealt with Csecho /-Slovakia/ twice, failed in its diplomacy by giving rise to the second Great World War by finally making a foe of England and France by annihilating Poland on the pretext of the Danzig problem?

Now, diplomacy presupposes the other party. It is by nature adaptable to any changes to suit the occasion, and it is not necessarily right to think that German diplomacy made a failure or a miscalculation in coming to the present War. Germany was always prepared for war and carried out all policies on that basis. That is to say, she was determined to resort to arms at any moment according to the other party's attitude towards her when she carried out her own positive policies.



In this way the victory of bloodless diplomacy came to be talked about, and her firm resolution was the same this time as before.

There is nothing more necessary at present than such close connection of diplomacy and military force.

The conclusion of the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union gives us an impression that both countries were, evily-speaking, too crafty. I think this infuriated not a few of the people. I think we cannot, however, rightly oppose /denounce/ this as the last measure Germany resorted to in her critical situation when by this means she would either be forced to make operations on two fronts or by only one front, or be able to avoid war. Is not the Soviet Union at present desiring merely to advance to the Baltic Sea on one hand and to reach a rapprochement with Japan in the Far East on the other? Diplomacy of course admits of no conjecture, but I think it may be possible at this juncture to make the Soviet Union wash her hands of China.

Fuehrer Hitler carries on German diplomacy himself. Ribbentrop is a good assistant to him. Hitler himself was a superior private in the World War /I/ and has no experience whatsoever as a diplomat. He has become from his particular character a first-class personage and diplomat in the world.

He takes to histories and philosophical works while busy in state affairs, meditates hard and is devising all policies from the principles which have crystallized in his head. Ribbentrop is quite one with Hitler and has a good understanding of Hitler's diplomatic belief, and it is not too much to say that German diplomacy lies in the hands of these two. Such being the case, quick daring diplomacy could be carried out which astonished the world. Ribbentrop has an acute intellect and a quick perception--a thing which Germans seldom have. He also has a very strong will and is a type of man who never fails to go through what he has determined to do. He is exactly the right diplomatic assistant who has no match in the positive diplomacy that is the upshot of the present "Nazis' ideology". Ribbentrop's trait is, to be more exact, to spare no pains. Usually no policies are carried out without some obstacles or other. He is truly a modern



international statesman who is ready, in such cases, to fly to Rome or London and handles the matter quickly. Being such a type of active man, he does not stick to trifles or care about minor details in negotiation or dispute, but tries to grasp main points. In this sense, I could not but recognize his quick perception in my various actual negotiations.

He is not a very early riser, as foreigners go, but tenaciously sits at work very late at night. He is quite a different type of statesman from the so-called petty officials.

I had much intercourse with Goering and other military men while I was a resident officer, and I have been acquainted with Ribbentrop and other diplomats and statesmen since I was an ambassador. These men gave me an impression that the Nazi leaders were all settled in resolution and that they were young.

Since the München disturbance in November, 1923, the present Nazis have been under the oppression of communism and social democracy, have often lingered on the verge of death, have exposed themselves to danger from morning till night--they have busied themselves so much to make the defeated Germany what she is today--a fact which I think has had an effect upon their character, has trained them and has made of them statesmen who are sincerely anxious about the future of their country and grapple with their national crisis.

As Germans usually do, Fuehrer Hitler strongly trusts and respects Japan. It is true that he had political interest, but he depends much upon the Japanese nationality and the character of the Japanese.

Hitler paid attention to German history and the traditions of the foundation of their country, upon which school education also laid stress. This is perhaps because he knew that a man could not perform his duty as a citizen of his country unless he respected the history of his country. It was quite natural that he respected our history of 2600 years.

He also teaches, "Be always brave". In his speech in the Reichstag of Sep. 1, he said, "Let Goering be commander when I am killed at the front; let Hess succeed Goering when he dies; and choose the bravest Nazi when Hess dies," and went immediately to the front and to



the first line. The Japanese are likewise very brave, a people who do not fear death. Hitler was thus faithful to his belief and loved to be bold and daring.

It is quite natural that even the parties concerned should be unable to foretell the saying, "what will become of the European War". The view is prevalent that a modern war is a protracted national total war. Germany is now of course well aware of this. And yet she has entered into war, so we might think that she is prepared for a protracted war and at the same time has confidence in her operations to win the war in a short time.

Victory is, however, as is called, an uncertain affair. Nobody can tell which side will win.

It is dangerous to judge the present war by the standards of past wars. What were operations on two fronts before are now operations on one front, and each country is trying to localise the war. We have to constantly watch how the world is moving, to make a good study of war and to ponder quietly upon its results. Whether they are participants or not, all Powers are affected by the war in question. Our Government, at this juncture, must establish national policies and to exert itself to carry them out.

Our policies towards the United States and towards the Soviet Union must be grasped in a wide sense as links of our world policy. A far-sighted policy has to be formulated for future Japan so as to win the consent of the people.

The European War occurred after a lapse of 25 years. Everybody must take this opportunity to lead Japan to greater prosperity in the world.